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NOTES
Creditor in the Middle Ages, Law Quarterly Review, April,
1927, and The Law and the Insolvent Debtor (1927) 12
ST. Louis L. REv. 189.
THE SCHOOL OF LAW AND THE ST. LOUIS
RECEIVERSHIP SURVEY
The report of the Receivership Survey Committee of the
St. Louis Bar Association, made public February 20, 1934, has
been welcomed by lawyers and by business men generally, as an
earnest effort on the part of the Bar Association to clear the
clouded factual atmosphere surrounding a branch of the law
which has long been the subject of controversy in St. Louis-re-
ceivership practice in the St. Louis Circuit Courts. Conse-
quently, it was considered appropriate that this issue of the
ST. Louis LAw REvIEw be devoted, primarily, to consideration of
receivership law-theory and practice.
The School of Law of Washington University has been inti-
mately associated with the Receivership Survey since its incep-
tion. Assistant Professor Israel Treiman planned and directed
the activities of the fact-gatherers whose findings constituted the
basis for the general report of the Receivership Survey Com-
mittee. Joseph H. Grand, Daniel Bartlett, and John Gilmore,
graduates of the School of Law, were members of the Bar Associa-
tion Committee. The work of collecting the facts was done
mainly by C. S. Cullenbine and David Campbell, graduates of the
School of Law, assisted by Herbert K. Moss, Lewis Sigler, Sylvia
Carafiol, and Elizabeth Kausch, all students or graduates of the
School of Law.
The School of Law has welcomed the opportunity of cooperat-
ing with the Bar Association in an investigation which should
have a considerable practical effect as a basis for reforms in re-
ceivership practice in St. Louis and in the State of Missouri.
Notes
GROUNDS FOR RECEIVERSHIP IN MISSOURI
The appointment of a receiver is primarily a mode of action by
the Equity court, rather than a benefit to be given to either of the
litigants. The nature of a receiver is adequately defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Booth v. Clark:1
1 (1854) 17 How. 322, 1. c. 331; see Crawford v. Ross (1869) 39 Ga. 44;
Beverley v. Brooks (1847) 4 Gratt. (Va.) 187.
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A receiver is an indifferent person between the parties, ap-
pointed by the court to receive the rent, issues, or profits of
land or other thing in question in the court, pending the suit,
when it does not seem reasonable to the court that either
party should do it. . . . He is an officer of the court; his
appointment is provisional. He is appointed in behalf of all
parties, and not of the complainant or of the defendant only.
He is appointed for the benefit of all parties who may estab-
lish rights in the cause. The money in his hands is in
custodia legis for whoever can make out a title to it ...
It is the court itself which has the care of the property in
dispute. The receiver is but the creature of the court; he has
no powers except such as are conferred upon him by the order
of his appointment and the course and practice of the court.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the appointment of a re-
ceiver cannot be made an end in itself. It is ancillary to that re-
lief of the complainant which is the, main object of the suit.2 The
Missouri courts, in discussing the general equitable grounds and
nature of receiverships have clearly adopted this view.3
Courts of Equity have inherent discretionary power to appoint
a receiver,4 unless limited or defined by express statute.5 A
2 Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen (1922) 294 U. S. 491; In re Richardson's
Estate (1923) 294 F. 349; Wilson v. Waltham Watch Co. (1923) 293 F. 811;
1 Clark, Receivers (2d ed. 1929) see. 51.
3 Jones v. Schaff Bros. Co. (1915) 187 Mo. App. 597, 174 S. W. 177; Pullis
v. Pullis (1900) 65 Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095; State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross
(1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947; State ex rel. Calhoun v. Reynolds (1922)
289 Mo. 506, 233 S. W. 483; State ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun (1920) 207 Mo.
App. 149, 226 S. W. 329. "It is fundamental that there is neither in law or
in equity any such thing as a plain receivership action, i. e. an action in
which a receiver is the only desideratum. In short the appointment of a
receiver by a court of equity, except in rare cases arising out of lunacy or in-
fancy, is ancillary wholly to some other action having some definite relief in
view." Price v. Banker's Trust Co. (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 745.
4 Laumier v. Sun-Ray Products Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. (2d)
640; Cox v. Volkert (1885) 86 Mo. 505; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4th ed., 1919) sec. 1483.
5 For instance the following statutes affecting the appointment of re-
ceivers are in force in Missouri: Attachments, R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 1303:
Authorizes circuit court to appoint receivers in aid of attachments- "..
in a proper case." Sec. 2244: Justice of the Peace shall not have "power to
appoint a receiver of attached property." Corporations: R. S. Mo. 1929,
Sec. 4580: Upon a corporation's failure to obey a writ of mandamus "the
court or judge may, upon application of the plaintiff, . . . fine such cor-
poration in any sum whatsoever, and appoint a receiver and direct that he
take possession of and preserve, control and manage all the property, rights,
privileges, franchises and business of such corporation, and that he proceed
to do the act or acts required to be done by such peremptory writ of man-
damus. . . ." Sec. 4597: Provides for the appointment of a receiver for
corporations formed in a foreign country and maintaining an office within the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss2/7
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statute declaratory of this principle has been enacted in Missouri.6
This statement of the broad rule of law applicable is acceptable to
all. Difficulties arise when attempts are made to lay down prin-
ciples which are to guide the exercise of judicial discretion in the
granting of receiverships. The cases and textbooks point out
three major principles by which judicial discretion is to be
guided.1 These are: (1) imminent danger to the property in-
volved; (2) reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail
on the merits; (3) insolvency of the defendant, if accompanied
state. Sec. 5008: On judgment of forfeiture or dissolution of benevolent,
religious, fraternal, etc., corporation, the court may appoint a receiver.
See. 5063: "In case of the failure of" a bond investment company "the cir-
cuit court of the county or city in which the principal office is located, upon
the application of one or more of the shareholders, shall appoint a receiver
for such company. . . ." Secs. 5626-27: Provisions for appointment of re-
ceiver for building and loan associations. See. 4993: Provides for receiver
for co-operative company. See. 6016: Provides for receiver for fraternal
insurance company. Sec. 6017: Only the attorney-general can make such
an application. Sec. 5965: Receiver for insurance company can be appointed
on the petition of the superintendent of insurance. Sec. 4960: Court may
appoint receivers of manufacturing and business companies. Sec. 4768: Re-
ceiver for railroad for violation of statutory regulations with regard to ship-
ments of grain in bulk. See. 8706: Receiver for corporation violating statu-
tory provision against pools, trusts, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Married Woman's Property: R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 1518: "Any married woman
may file her petition in the circuit court setting forth that her husband, from
habitual intemperance, or any other cause, is about to squander and waste
the property, money, credits or choses in action to which she is entitled in
her own right, . . . or is proceeding fraudulently to convert the same
. . . to his own use . . . ,and the court may, upon hearing of the case,
enjoin the husband . . . and may appoint a receiver to control and manage
the same for the benefit of the wife. . . ." Miscellaneous; R. S. Mo. 1929,
See. 3064: Court may "at discretion" during redemption period appoint re-
ceiver to take charge of the property. Sec. 3128: Vendee may be receiver
in case of fraudulent sales of merchandise (bulk sales law). Sec. 2626: "If
the tenant in possession of any land shall, pending a suit to recover or charge
said land, commit waste thereon, the court in which the suit may be pend-
ing may order a receiver to take possession of the land." Sec. 1176: Evi-
dences of debt are liable to seizure and being placed in hands of a receiver
appointed by the court.
I "The court, or any judge thereof in vacation, shall have the power to
appoint a receiver, whenever such appointment shall be deemed necessary,
whose duty it shall be to keep and preserve any money or other thing de-
posited in court, or that may be subject to tender, and to keep and preserve
all property and protect any business or interest entrusted to him pending
any legal or equitable proceeding concerning the same, subject to the order
of the court." R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 998. This statute has been held to be
declaratory of the general equitable jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, Price
v. Banker's Trust Co. (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 745, and "does not shorten the
arm of the court," Greeley v. Provident Savings Bank (1891) 103 Mo. 212,
15 S. W. 429.
7 Bushman v. Bushman (1925) 311 Mo. 551, 279 S. W. 122; 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed., 1919) pp. 3504-3508; 1 Clark, Receivers (2d
ed., 1929) sec. 49.
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by other factors such as the absence of any legal remedy, or any
other equitable ground justifying such relief. Obviously, these
so-called guides are very general. About the most definite state-
ment which can be made is that the appellate courts will not re-
verse the discretionary act of the judge granting the appoint-
ment, unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion.8
These general guides or principles have been enunciated in
the Missouri appellate decisions. The spirit of the above men-
tioned guides has been applied fairly in the consideration by
the higher tribunals of those receivership cases which have come
before them for review. The first group of cases to be reviewed
here are those in which it has been held that the factual set-
ups did warrant the appointment of a receiver, and that the
lower court had not erred in making such appointment.
In Cantwell v. Columbia Lead Company9 the petitioner was a
minority stockholder in the defendant corporation, who alleged
that the majority of the stockholders, aided and abetted by the
board of directors and the officers of the corporation, were trying
to force out the minority by unfair means and mismanagement.
The court stated:
"The board of directors of a company are but trustees of an
estate for all the stockholders, and may not only be amenable
to the law, personally, for a breach of trust, but the corporate
power under colour of office to effectuate a contemplated
wrong may be taken from them when by fraud, conspiracy,
or covinous conduct or extreme mismanagement, the rights
of the minority stockholders are put in imminent peril, and
the underlying, original, corporate entente cordiale is un-
fairly destroyed."
In Stark v. Grimes10 the plaintiffs were the heirs of the defend-
ant's deceased wife, and alleged that there had been an agreement
between the defendant and his wife that neither should receive
any of the other's estate at death. Upon the death of the wife, the
defendant had been appointed administrator. The plaintiffs,
suing to obtain the property to which they alleged themselves en-
titled, prayed the appointment of a receiver pending this suit, on
the ground that such appointment was necessary in view of the
conflict of interests and extreme unfriendliness existing between
them and the defendant. The substitute court held that a re-
ceiver had properly been appointed as a relief ancillary to the
main purpose of the plaintiffs' suit.
8 Abramsky v. Abramsky (1914) 261 Mo. 117, 168 S. W. 1178; State ex rel.
Hampe v. Ittner (1924) 304 Mo. 125, 263 S. W. 158.
9 (1906) 199 Mo. 1, 97 S. W. 167.
10 (1901) 88 Mo. App. 409.
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In Smith v. Kansas and Independence Short Line Railroad
Company1 the defendant corporation was in debt, and the plain-
tiff stockholders were liable for debts but were entitled to be re-
imbursed by the other stockholders, according to the number of
shares held by them. There had been no acting officers of the cor-
poration for eighteen months and the corporate franchise had
been forfeited. The Court of Appeals held upon review that the
appointment of a receiver by the lower court was justified, be-
cause there was no adequate remedy at law for the stockholders,
and they were in great danger of losing more money unless a re-
ceiver was appointed.
The above three cases are typical of those in which the Missouri
appellate courts have allowed receiverships granted by the lower
courts to stand, as properly granted.12 The next group of cases
includes those in which lower court action has not been sustained.
Consequently either the decision of the lower court was reversed
or a writ of prohibition was issued to prevent the receiver from
discharging his functions.
In State ex rel. Hadley v. People's United States Bank' 3 a re-
ceiver had been appointed on the relation of the attorney-general,
on the ground that there had been mismanagement of the bank.
There had been purchases of stock by the defendant bank in other
companies, which purchases were ultra vires. In addition there
had been a fraud order issued by the postmaster against the bank,
and its president had appointed dummy directors. The Supreme
Court of Missouri held that there was no adequate ground for
the appointment of a receiver in this case: first, because the ultra
vires acts had been discontinued and there was no immediate dan-
ger to the bank therefrom; second: the mere fact that a fraud
order had been issued did not mean that the officers of the bank
could not change its policy and put it back in good condition;
third, under the flexible power of the court, authorized by statute,
11 (1892) 52 Mo. App. 439.
12 The following are Missouri cases in which the appellate courts affirmed
the appointment of a receiver by the trial court: Cox v. Volkert (1885) 86
Mo. 505; Thompson v. Greeley (1891) 107 Mo. 577, 17 S. W. 962; Glover v.
St. Louis Mutual Bond Inv. Co. (1897) 138 Mo. 408, 40 S. W. 110; State v.
Phoenix Loan Ass'n (1900) 159 Mo. 102, 60 S. W. 74; Tuttle v. Blow (1903)
176 Mo. 158, 75 S. W. 617; State v. Shelton (1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W.
417; State v. Guthrie (1912) 245 Mo. 144, 149 S. W. 305; State v. McQuillan
(1914) 261 Mo. 117, 168 S. W. 1178; State ex rel. Elam v. Henson (Mo. 1919)
217 S. W. 17; Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Mo. Bus Co. (Mo. 1921) 233
S. W. 167; State ex rel. Hampe v. Ittner (1924) 304 Mo. 135, 263 S. W. 158;
Keokuk Northern Pipe Line Co. v. Davison (1886) 13 Mo. App. 561; Martin
v. Hurley (1900) 84 Mo. App. 670; Hammar v. St. Louis Motor Carriage Co.(1911) 155 Mo. App. 441, 134 S. W. 1060; Moser v. Renner (Mo. App. 1931)
40 S. W. (2d) 490; Williams v. Safety Savings and Loan Ass'n (Mo. App.
1933) 58 S. W. (2d) 787.
1 (1906) 197 Mo. 598, 94 S. W. 953.
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the court could have taken care of the fact that there were too
many proxies in the hands of one man. Consequently none of the
necessary elements justifying appointment of a receiver were
present in the case-there was an adequate remedy at law and no
imminent danger that the bank would lose more money.
In State ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun,14 a receiver had been ap-
pointed in the circuit court under the following set of facts: Re-
ceivers had been appointed for the Blue Bird Manufacturing
Company, which owned 51 per cent of the stock of the Blue Bird
Appliance Company. The latter company owed the former
$250,000. Other creditors were making attachments upon the
property of the Appliance Company, whose officers and directors
had resigned. The receivers of the Manufacturing Company
prayed that a receiver be appointed for the Appliance Company,
to safeguard the stock value and creditor's claim which the Manu-
facturing Company had in the Appliance Company. The Court
of Appeals held that there were no grounds justifying appoint-
ment of the receiver for the Appliance Company, because since
the receivers of the Manufacturing Company had control of the
Appliance Company they could elect new officers and protect
themselves.
A recent example of the strict compliance of the Supreme Court
of Missouri with the general equitable principles of receivership
appointment is State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy,5 in which a stock-
holder petitioned for the appointment of a receiver, alleging that
due to mismanagement and changed economic conditions the cor-
poration was indebted beyond any possibility of repaying all of
outstanding obligations and could not possibly be operated at
a profit. The Supreme Court, directing a writ of prohibition
against further action of the receiver appointed in the lower court,
pointed out that a receiver is to be appointed only where there
is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will obtain the ulti-
mate relief sought. In the particular case, because the corpora-
tion, according to the plaintiff's allegations, was so deeply in-
debted that it could not pay even the claims of its creditors, there
was no chance that the petitioning stockholders could ultimately
obtain the relief sought, namely some recovery on his invest-
ment.16
14 (1920) 207 Mo. App. 149, 226 S. W. 329.
3. (1931) 329 Mo. 1, 43 S. W. (2d) 806.
16 The following are Missouri cases wherein the appellate courts have re-
versed the granting of a receiver by the lower court: State ex rel. Merriam v.
Ross (1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947; St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Wear (1896)
135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357; Miller v. Perkins (1900) 154 Mo. 629, 55 S. W.
875; St. Louis National Bank v. Field (1900) 156 Mo. 306, 56 S. W. 1095;
Pullis v. Pullis (1900) 157 Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095; Loomis v. Missouri Pa-
cific R. R. Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 469, 65 S. W. 962; Reese v. Andrews (1902)
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In the light of the strict tests laid down by the Missouri appel-
late decisions with regard to grounds justifying the appointment
of a receiver, it is interesting to note that in the statistical report
featured in this issue of the REVIEW, 17 it is pointed out that out of
603 applications for receivership during the eight years from
1925 to 1932, 330 of the cases resulted in appointments, and in
only 31 out of the remaining 273 did the court formally deny the
appointment after a hearing. This generosity in appointment
would seem to indicate that the Circut Courts of St. Louis seem
hardly to have applied the strict tests of the appellate decisions
considered in this note.
The percentage of receivership cases which have been taken
on appeal to the higher courts of Missouri is very low. It is, how-
ever, probably not unreasonable to assume that this dearth of
appeals has been due not to the fact that the circuit judge has not
exceeded his discretion, but rather to the fact that once the re-
ceiver has been appointed the damage to the defendant has been
done, and to appeal the case would be practically futile.
JOHN E. CURBY, '34.
THE INTEREST REQUIRED OF A PETITIONER FOR
RECEIVERSHIP IN MISSOURI
The two student notes included in this receivership issue of the
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW are intended to supplement the statistical
report upon receiverships in the Circuit Courts of St. Louis, which
is the feature article of the issue.1 The note preceding this one
considered the grounds for receivership in Missouri, in other
words the factual set-ups in which the courts have deemed it
necessary and proper that this drastic equitable remedy be ap-
plied. This note contemplates a consideration of the interest
which a petitioner for receivership must show to give himself
standing in court. The former note was an effort to answer the
169 Mo. 177, 69 S. W. 4; Ashton v. Penfield (1911) 233 Mo. 391, 135 S. W.
938; Price v. Banker's Trust Co. (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 745; Sedberry v.
Gwynn (1920) 282 Mo. 632, 222 S. W. 629; State ex rel. Caron v. Dearing
(1921) 291 Mo. 169, 236 S. W. 629; Ward v. National Ice Cream Co. (Mo.
1922) 246 S. W. 554; Bushman v. Bushman (1925) 311 Mo. 551, 279 S. W.
122; Ingram v. Clover Leaf Lumber Co. (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 295; State
ex rel. Lund and Sager v. Mulloy (1932) 330 Mo. 333, 49 S. W. (2d) 1;
Laumier v. Sun-Ray Products Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. (2d) 640;
Blades v. Billings Mfg. Co. (1915) 187 Mo. App. 597, 174 S. W. 177; State
ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun (1920) 207 Mo. App. 149, 226 S. W. 329.
17 Treiman, An Analysis of the Statistical Data on Receivership Suits Filed
in the St. Louis Circuit Court 1925-1932 Inclusive (1934) 19 ST. Louis
L. REV. 87.
1 19 ST. Louis L. REv. 87.
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